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THE VIOLENT BEAR IT AWAY
EMMETT TILL & THE MODERNIZATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
MISSISSIPPI
ANDERS WALKER ∗

ABSTRACT
Few racially motivated crimes have left a more lasting imprint on
American memory than the death of Emmett Till. Yet, even as
Till’s murder in Mississippi in 1955 has come to be remembered as
a catalyst for the civil rights movement, it contributed to something
else as well. Precisely because it came on the heels of the Supreme
Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Till’s death
convinced Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman that certain
aspects of the state’s handling of racial matters had to change.
Afraid that popular outrage over racial violence might encourage
federal intervention in the region, Coleman removed power from
local sheriffs, expanded state police, and modernized the state’s
criminal justice apparatus in order to reduce the chance of further
racial violence in the state. Though his results proved mixed,
many of Coleman’s reforms lived on, contributing to the end of
public torture and lynching as an accepted mode of punishment in
the state. This article discusses those changes, suggesting that they
not only influenced the fight for civil rights, but encouraged the
modernization of criminal justice in the South.
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They tortured him and did some evil things too evil to
repeat. There was screaming sounds inside the barn,
there was laughing sounds out on the street. 1

INTRODUCTION
Sometime during the summer of 1955, Emmett Till left the
bustling metropolis of Chicago for the quiet pastoral of the
Mississippi Delta. Till’s mother had arranged for her son to spend
time with his uncle, Moses Wright, who lived in a small town
named Money, not far from the sleepy oak-lined streets of
Greenwood. Only fourteen, Till knew little of Mississippi’s past,
nor of its strict code of racial conduct, a code that was enforced
both legally through an elaborate system of statutory prohibitions
on interracial contact and extra-legally, through vigilante action.
Till’s unfamiliarity with local norms made him bold enough to do
the unthinkable: to try to impress a cadre of local youths by
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approaching a white woman and, as that woman later testified in
court, propositioning her. 2
Retribution proved swift. Not long after Till approached
Carolyn Bryant, her husband Roy Bryant and his half brother, J.W.
Milam knocked on the door of Moses Wright’s house, asking for
the boy. Brandishing arms, Milam and Bryant seized Till, drove
him to a remote location near the Tallahatchie River, and in an
attempt to get what they later described as an apology, tortured
him. 3 As far as authorities could tell from Till’s body, later found
floating in the river, the torture session lasted for hours, as Milam
and Bryant alternately punched, pistol-whipped, shot and
eventually drowned the boy, tying him to a two-hundred pound
cotton gin fan with barbed wire. 4
Though the torture and murder took place outside of the
public eye, the savagery of the crime attracted national attention
when Till’s mother Mamie Bradley ordered the body brought back
to Chicago. 5 Once there, Bradley left her son’s casket open in a
public wake, attracting thousands of viewers. 6 Charles Diggs, a
black congressman from Detroit, later explained how a picture of
Till’s partly decomposed, mangled corpse, reprinted in Jet
magazine, turned the incident into a national scandal.7 “I think
that was probably one of the greatest media products in the last
forty or fifty years,” recounted Diggs, “because that picture
stimulated a lot of interest and a lot of anger on the part of blacks
all over the country.” 8
While the anger generated by Till’s murder is often cited as
a catalyst for the civil rights movement, it sparked something else
as well. 9 Precisely because it came on the heels of the Supreme
Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Till’s death
2

Some claimed that Till whistled at Carolyn Bryant. Others, including Carolyn
herself claimed that he entered her store and propositioned her. STEPHEN J.
WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988).
Recent evidence suggests that Till acted on a dare, attempting to impress his
peers by approaching a white woman. THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A
DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE, (Christopher Metress, ed. 2002). Curtis Jones’s
interview for “Eyes on the Prize,” reprinted in VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S 3
(Henry Hampton, Steve Fayer, Sarah Flynn, eds., 1990).
3
William Bradford Huie, “Approved Killing in Mississippi,” LOOK, Jan. 1956.
4
Id.
5
Till’s wake is described in “Bury Slain Boy,” CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 7, 1955,
5.
6
Id.
7
Charles Diggs interview for “Eyes on the Prize” television series, reprinted in
VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S, 7 (Henry Hampton, Steve Fayer, Sarah Flynn,
eds. 1990).
8
Id.
9
Id.
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convinced Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman that certain
aspects of the state’s handling of racial matters had to change.
Afraid that popular outrage over racial violence might encourage
federal intervention in the region, Coleman removed power from
local sheriffs, expanded state police, and modernized the state’s
criminal justice apparatus in order to reduce the chance of further
racial violence in the state. Though his results proved mixed,
many of Coleman’s reforms lived on, contributing to the end of
public torture and lynching as an accepted mode of punishment in
the state. This article discusses those changes, repositioning Till’s
murder, and Brown, in the historical narrative of the time,
suggesting that they not only contributed to the fight for civil
rights, but the modernization of criminal justice in the South.
While legal historians have shown that civil rights triggered
an explosion of extremism in the South, Coleman’s response to
Till suggests that the struggle for racial equality did something else
as well. 10 It pushed the South to centralize authority, rein in local
officials, improve the administration of justice and adopt a less
publicly violent stance towards blacks. Long decried for its
toleration of the public torture and lynching of African Americans,
Mississippi began to discourage any form of public racial violence
in the aftermath of Till’s murder. Though the torture of African
Americans and civil rights activists did not stop, it assumed a more
surreptitious role in political life.
To show how this happened, this article will proceed in
seven parts. Part I will provide some background on race relations
in Mississippi, using James P. (JP) Coleman’s political career as a
lens through which to view the state’s struggle to deal with racial
violence in the aftermath of World War II. Part II will discuss the
rise of extremism in the state immediately following Brown, and
how Coleman resisted it. Part III will discuss Coleman’s efforts to
counter-balance the NAACP’s attempts to use the murder of
Emmett Till along with crimes against other African Americans as
a device for rallying popular support in favor of federal
intervention in Mississippi as early as the 1950s. Part IV will
recover Coleman’s efforts at modernization, showing how he
centralized state law enforcement power in an attempt to rein in
local sheriffs and thwart extremists. Part V will discuss Coleman’s
use of black agents to reduce the chance of racial violence in the
state. Part VI will discuss Coleman’s response to the lynching of
Mack Charles Parker, an African American accused of raping a
twenty-three year old white woman in 1959. Part VII will show
how even though Coleman was replaced by extremist Ross Barnett
in 1960 he returned to the task of imposing a strict vision of anti10
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extremist yet tough law enforcement in 1965, as a Lyndon Johnson
appointee to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Why recover the story of Mississippi’s response to Emmett
Till now? There are at least three reasons. First, recent Supreme
Court rulings have convinced many that Brown’s legacy amounts
to little more than a call for ending overtly discriminatory laws. 11
Recovering Mississippi’s response to Till suggests that Brown also
contributed to a dramatic transformation in southern criminal
justice, a transformation that reduced local autonomy, increased
centralized control, and modernized southern approaches to
maintaining social order.
Understanding the process of modernization that occurred
in Mississippi in the 1950s helps to explain how states known for
using the “spectacle” of violence to maintain social peace, moved
towards a more “gentle way in punishment,” namely mass
incarceration. 12 As of 2007, Mississippi was fourth in the nation
for the percentage of its population in prison, all of the highest
percentages being in the South. 13 While a disproportionate
number of these prisoners are African Americans, the reforms
begun by Coleman also facilitated control of whites. This means
that the push for freedom in the Deep South contributed not just to
desegregation, but to the rise of a more centralized, intrusive police
state.
Mississippi’s turn away from localism towards a more
intrusive state helps explain the final reason for recovering its
response to Till. From the beginning of the Civil War until the
1950s, Mississippi relied not simply on legal regulations or law
enforcement to preserve its racial hierarchy, but also on the private
torture and murder of African Americans, a process known as
lynching. 14 Though never formally sanctioned by law, lynching
11

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551
U.S. ____ (2007). For responses, see Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III,
A Re-Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social Landscape of Desegregation
from Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District, 2007 BYU EDUC. & LAW J. 217 (2007); Goodwin Liu, Seattle
and Louisville 95 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2007); Joseph O. Oluwole, Preston C.
Greene III, Charter Schools: Racial-Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved
61 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2008).
12
I borrow the term “gentle punishment” from Michel Foucault, who tracks the
decline of public torture in France during the eighteenth century. During that
time, France moved away from “the spectacle of the scaffold” and towards a
more “gentle way in punishment.” Mississippi’s official attitude towards
lynching exhibited a similar path. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 32, 104 (Alan Sheridan, trans. 1977).
13
PEW Center on the States, “One in 100: Behind Bars in 2008,” 34.
14
Though lynching occurred during the antebellum period, it took on a “new
significance” during and after the Civil War. JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT
AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN
AGAINST LYNCHING 131 (1993); ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF

5

was rarely interfered with by law enforcement. 15 Precisely
because lynching occurred in plain view, it acted as a type of
public ritual, a “spectacle” aimed at disciplining the African
American population while galvanizing the white. 16 Critical to
this spectacle was not simply the execution of black victims, but
the torture of them, including the “marking of victims” and the
punishment of them in “spectacular” ways, through for example
dismemberment, burning, or hanging. 17
While Governor Coleman did not bring an absolute end to
the spectacle of lynching, he did facilitate a larger transformation
in punishment, shifting it from public spectacle to juridical
obscurity. No longer of use to public governance, torture became a
more sporadic, surreptitious practice. Precisely because of the
public outrage at the manner in which Till had been mangled,
future tortures had to be carried out in a way that left no trace. For
those alarmed at the apparent resurgence of torture in the TwentyFirst Century United States, recovering Coleman’s story helps cast
new torture tactics like water-boarding and the horrors of Abu
Ghraib in a new light, products not simply of an increased ferocity,
but an increased attention, ironically, to civil rights.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Born on December 9, 1914, J.P. Coleman grew up on a
farm in Mississippi’s hill country, a region known for an
“unprecedented outbreak” of lynching in the 1890s. 18 When
Coleman was five, a second wave of lynching washed across the
South, prompted by the return of black soldiers from World War
I. 19 Had Coleman not been influenced by his grandfather, he
might have grown to view lynching as a natural part of the
established social order, but the old Confederate soldier
LYNCHING (1933); CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, THE MANY FACES OF JUDGE
LYNCH (2002). Lynching increased dramatically following the disfranchisement
of African Americans in the 1890s. See e.g. Terence Finnegan, Lynching and
Political Power in Mississippi and South Carolina, in UNDER SENTENCE OF
DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 201-209 (Fitzhugh Brundage, ed., 1997).
15
Laura J. Griffin, Paula Clark, and Joanne C. Sandberg, “Narrative and Event:
Lynching and Historical Sociology,” in UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH, supra note
11, at 33, 36.
16
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 9, at 32. See also JACQUELYN DOWD
HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S
CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 139 (1993).
17
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 9, at 34. See also HALL, REVOLT, supra
note 16.
18
Finnegan, “Lynching and Political Power,” supra note 14, at 205.
19
HALL, REVOLT, supra note 16, at 60.
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encouraged the boy to read the Congressional Record, pointing
him in a direction that would lead him to the heart of national
politics. Inspired by what he read, Coleman began to borrow law
books from a district attorney in Ackerman named Aaron Lane
Ford. When Ford decided to run for a United States House seat in
1934 he asked Coleman to go through the Record looking for
information on his opponent Thomas Jefferson Busby. Coleman
ably compiled a notebook documenting Busby’s absences from
particular votes, prompting Ford to invite him to take a job on his
staff in Washington. 20
Coleman’s move to the nation’s capitol, where he worked
as Ford’s secretary by day and attended classes at the George
Washington University School of Law by night proved
enlightening. For the next four years, he immersed himself in
political life; listened to Supreme Court oral arguments, attended
congressional debates and participated in the Little Congress, an
organization of young clerks that met in the House Caucus room to
introduce and debate mock bills. During one debate, Coleman led
a successful challenge to an initiative brought by a young Texan
named Lyndon Baines Johnson, sparking a lifelong friendship
between the two. When Coleman ran for governor in 1955,
Johnson contributed financially to his campaign and Coleman, in
turn, supported Johnson for the presidency in 1956, 1960 and
1964. 21
From D.C., Mississippi looked different. Coleman arrived
just in time to see the election of Mississippi Senator Theodore
Bilbo, a populist who became infamous for engaging in vitriolic
displays of racial extremism on the Senate floor, attacking antilynch laws and blasting African Americans for wanting to
“mongrelize” the white race. 22 Though Coleman admired certain
elements of Bilbo’s political style, what he later termed his
“common touch,” he came to believe that his virulent racism did
Mississippi a “disservice.” 23 Instead, Coleman thought that the
South should project a positive image to the nation, striving to “be
on good terms with the people from the North,” precisely so that it
20

J.P. Coleman, interview with Dr. Orley P. Caudill, Ackerman, Mississippi,
November 12, 1981. Mississippi Oral History Program, University of Southern
Mississippi.
21
Coleman expressed his support for Johnson in the 1956 presidential race in a
letter. See Letter, J.P. Coleman to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, September 24,
1956, Folder: J.P. Coleman, Miss. Box 3, LBJA Famous Names, LBJ Library.
For Coleman’s support of Johnson in subsequent elections, and for Johnson’s
support of Coleman’s gubernatorial bid, see J.P. Coleman, interview with Orley
Caudill.
22
CHESTER M. MORGAN, REDNECK LIBERAL: THEODORE G. BILBO AND THE
NEW DEAL (1985); ADWIN W. GREEN, THE MAN BILBO (1976).
23
J.P. Coleman, interview with Orley B. Caudill, supra note 19.
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could develop positive national relationships conducive to its own
political interests. 24
Coleman’s appreciation for national opinion was bolstered
by southern history. By the time he became governor in 1956, he
had accumulated over four hundred books on the Civil War and
reminded voters repeatedly of the “dark days of Reconstruction”
when the federal government sent troops to occupy southern
states. 25 Conversely, he also reminded voters that the Supreme
Court had once been an ally of the South during the decades
following the Civil War, and could be again. 26 In fact, Coleman
even published an article on post-Civil War politics that coincided,
in many ways, with his campaign to mount a legalist response to
the Supreme Court in the 1950s. 27 In it, he showed how
Mississippi leaders in the 1890s had feared that defiance “would
bring evils upon the state,” not least among them “adverse
congressional legislation.” 28
Coleman confronted northern “evils” first hand after
returning to Mississippi and serving as Attorney General. 29 Not
long after taking office, Coleman defended the death sentence of
an alleged black rapist named Willie McGee. 30 McGee, who was
first convicted in 1945 for raping a white woman, became an
international cause celebre when a left-leaning, northern based
civil rights organization called the Civil Rights Congress (CRC)
discovered that McGee had been having a consensual affair with
his alleged victim. 31 The CRC decided not only to take up the case
24

Coleman discussed Bilbo in his interview with Dr. Orley B. Caudill. See J.P.
Coleman, interview, Orley B. Caudill. For coverage of the 1935 lynch law
debates in Congress, see “Senate Holds Firm for Lynching Test: Southerners
Plan to Adjourn and Thereby Sidetrack Bill,” N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1935, 20.
25
J.P. Coleman, “Meeting the School Crisis: An Address by Attorney General
J.P. Coleman,” delivered over the facilities of TV Station WLBT, Jackson,
Mississippi, June 1, 1954.
26
James P. Coleman, The Origin of the Constitution of 1890, XIX J. OF MISS.
HIST. (1957).
27
Id.
28
Coleman quoted these words, which were initially spoken by Judge Robert H.
Thompson at a Mississippi Bar Association meeting in 1923, about the 1890
Constitutional Convention in an article that he wrote for the Journal of
Mississippi History. See Coleman, supra note 26, at 73. In that piece, Coleman
also noted a turn to legalist evasion as a means of denying the black vote in
1890. Id., 87. For more on legalist evasion surrounding black voting rights, see
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910
(1974).
29
Cecil L. Sumners, THE GOVERNORS OF MISSISSIPPI 125-8 (1980).
30
For Coleman’s role in the case, and before the Supreme Court, see M’Gee
Execution Stayed by Court: High Bench Will Rule on New Appeal, N.Y. TIMES,
March 16, 1951, 23.
31
SARAH HART BROWN, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN
LAWYERS IN AN ERA OF FEAR (1998), 89-114.
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but to use it as a propaganda tool against the South, sending a full
motorcade to Jackson in 1950. 32 Thanks in part to the CRC,
McGee gained outside representation from New York attorney and
future congresswoman Bella Abzug, who battled J.P. Coleman all
the way to the Supreme Court. 33 Coleman’s eventual victory over
Abzug before the nation’s highest tribunal reinforced his
conviction that the Court could ultimately be made a southern ally
even as it alerted him to the manner in which outside groups could
use southern atrocities to fuel northern propaganda. 34 The McGee
case alone, for example, led to demonstrations in Chicago, Detroit,
and New York, not to mention letters pleading for McGee’s release
from political officials in countries as distant as China and the
Soviet Union. 35
Coleman’s experience securing the execution of Willie
McGee, along with his early experiences in Washington, help
explain his response to Till. Just as he had learned that racial
extremism did not help Theodore Bilbo’s image nationally, so too
did he fear that the reptilian violence of Till’s murder might
jeopardize the state. And, just as the McGee case generated
unwanted northern publicity for Mississippi, so too did the
acquittal of Milam and Bryant inflame the national press.
Avoiding further bad press struck Coleman as crucial, particularly
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling demanding
desegregated schools in Brown. Throughout his time as Governor,
Coleman remained convinced that integration would only occur if
northern power forced it. In his opinion, desegregation was not a
priority for Mississippi blacks but a radical northern goal,
sponsored by left-wing, elitist groups who had little concern for
average southern people. Coleman’s battles with the CRC – an
organization that had little if any tie to blacks in Mississippi – only
reinforced this view. To him, such groups obfuscated the fact that
Brown was bad for both races, and that segregation was in fact a
mutually beneficial arrangement. “I am for segregation not
because I hate Negroes,” he wrote one constituent in 1958, but
“because I know from experience, as you do, that that it is for the
best interest of both races.” 36 To him, segregation was a
“kindness” that made life “easier” for blacks by keeping them
protected from white extremists, ultimately representing an
32

Mississippi Arrests 41 at Capitol as Willie McGee Plea is Studied, N. Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1951, 1.
33
M’Gee’s Fourth Plea Fails in High Court, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1951, 20.
34
Id.
35
Group Joins in Fight for Execution Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1950, 23; 1,000
in Times Square Rally: ‘Save Willie McGee Group is Routed by Police, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1950, 32.
36
J.P. Coleman to C.C. Walsh, April 10, 1958, Folder: “Citizens’ Council,
1957-58,” Subgroup 5, Box 12, J.P. Coleman Correspondence, MDAH.
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“implement of orderly, peaceable government.” 37 Not only did it
neutralize racial tension but segregation also allowed blacks to
improve their lives free from white interference and control.
Of course, implicit in such a view was an inability to see
how segregation actually reinforced racial subordination. For
example, not only did Jim Crow laws separate whites and blacks in
public spaces, but they also facilitated a remarkable disparity in
resource allocation. For blacks, public accommodations were not
only set apart from whites, for example, but were often
considerably inferior. Black schools received less money, black
neighborhoods received fewer public services, black hospitals were
poorer, and black chances to rise out of poverty were blocked by
obstacles to professional education, licensing, and voting.
Coleman’s inability to see the potentially devastating effects of
such barriers to black advancement reflected a deeper blindness
that, while not vitriolic or violent, nevertheless made it impossible
for him to understand black demands in Mississippi at the time.
Indeed, Coleman was shocked when black leaders who had
previously assured white officials that they opposed integration
summoned the courage to denounce it during a meeting with
Governor Hugh White in Jackson in July 1954. Rather than take
this as a sign of black frustration with segregation, however,
Coleman took it as the reverse, evidence that groups like the CRC
and NAACP were brainwashing black leaders. 38
Confident that neither blacks nor whites wanted to send
their children to integrated schools, Coleman campaigned for
governor of Mississippi in 1955 on a platform of improving black
education while preventing racial violence. Committed to the
notion that segregation was in fact good for both races, Coleman
consciously avoided making negative statements about African
Americans, and refused to endorse extremist white organizations
like the Citizens’ Councils. This was particularly remarkable
given that the Councils had, since the summer of 1954, amassed
considerable popular support in favor of outright defiance to the
Supreme Court. 39 Coleman was the only one of five gubernatorial
candidates who did not to endorse the Councils, a move that he
rationalized by emphasizing the importance of serving “all the
37

Id.
J.P. Coleman, interview with Dr. Orley P. Caudill, supra note 20. Mississippi
Offers ‘Anything’ to Industry: Governor Coleman Heads a Hunting Party of
Seven Here, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1957, p. 29. John Dittmer provides evidence
substantiating Coleman’s suspicion that the NAACP pressured black leaders to
endorse integration the night before they were scheduled to meet Governor
Hugh White in July 1954. See JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 38-9 (1994).
39
NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS
IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 126-149 (1969).
38
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people” in the state. 40 That he won the election suggests that
Mississippi voters, who were overwhelmingly against
desegregation, remained somewhat open to the idea that there
might be more than one way of dealing with the Supreme Court,
besides just defiance, as late as 1955. 41

RESISTING “NULLIFICATION”
One of the earliest indications that J.P. Coleman opposed
defiance came only two weeks after the Brown ruling on June 1,
1954. Responding to concerns about the Supreme Court’s
desegregation order, Coleman went on Mississippi television and
proclaimed confidently that there was “plenty” the state could do
to preserve segregated schools without resorting to extremism. 42
For example, Coleman noted that the Brown opinion substituted
legal authority for “psychological and sociological” opinion and
did not mention either how or when the South had to end
segregation. 43 This meant, Coleman argued, that the state of
Mississippi could legally engage in a variety of measures to
preserve segregation by manipulating “normal district boundaries”
as well as assigning students to schools based on factors other than
race, like “health,” “aptitude,” and “intelligence.” 44
Convinced that “outside meddlers” had put “a few colored
children” up to challenging segregation in the South, Coleman
argued that black students by and large did not want to give up
“their own schools,” “their own associates,” and “their own
teachers” simply for the chance to integrate with whites.45 Not
only would such a move be challenged by “well-settled social
rules” in Mississippi, he argued, but it would also mark an illconsidered rejection of substantive increases in black teachers’
salaries together with new, greatly improved black facilities in
Mississippi. 46 African Americans of “good judgment,” contended

40

Coleman reflected on his opposition to the Councils in a letter to a constituent
in 1958. See J.P. Coleman to C.C. Smith, April 10, 1958, Folder: “Citizens’
Council, 1957-1958,” Subgroup 5, Box 12, J.P. Coleman Correspondence,
MDAH.
41
Mississippi: The Six-Foot Wedge” TIME, March 4, 1957, 25.
42
J.P. Coleman, “Meeting the School Crisis: An Address by Attorney General
J.P. Coleman,” delivered over the facilities of TV Station WLBT, Jackson,
Mississippi, June 1, 1954.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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Coleman would not exchange “a bird in the hand” for “nothing” in
the bush. 47
Coleman’s conviction that blacks lacked real commitment
to integration contrasted starkly to the claims of many white
extremists who argued vigorously that blacks were eager to
integrate for the unlikely reason that they wanted to engage in
interracial sex. 48 Such claims, though preposterous, became the
centerpiece of extremist positions like those held by Mississippi
circuit judge Thomas Pickens Brady in 1954. Brady, popularized
the view that integration would lead to “amalgamation” in a speech
delivered to a group of white citizens in Greenwood, Mississippi
only a few weeks after Brown was decided. Lamenting the impact
that integration would have on southern society, Brady announced
that black activists wanted to “get on the inter-marriage turnpikes”
in pursuit of a “social program for amalgamation of the two races”
that would “blow out the light” in the “white man’s brain.” 49 Such
claims, though absurd, played on longstanding fears of interracial
sex in the South and inspired members of Brady’s audience to
form the first Citizens’ Council in the summer of 1954. 50
The Citizens’ Councils, a segregationist organization that
eschewed violence but embraced economic coercion and legal
defiance spread quickly through the South, forming the backbone
of a larger political movement to reject Brown known as massive
resistance. Massive resistance, a term coined by Virginia Senator
Harry F. Byrd in 1956, rested on the flawed assumption that the
best method of opposing the Supreme Court was outright defiance.
This opposition drew dubious constitutional strength from a theory
popularized by a Virginia newspaper editor named James Jackson
Kilpatrick in a series of editorials in November 1955 called
interposition. First devised by James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson in the 1790s, interposition held that individual states
could substitute, or interpose their own interpretations of
constitutional law for those of the Supreme Court, thereby freeing
47
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them of any duty to obey legal rulings like Brown. While such a
position had motivated southern leaders like John C. Calhoun
during the first half of the nineteenth century, and arguably still
inspired southerners like Kilpatrick in the twentieth, interposition
made little constitutional sense in 1955. At best, it was a formal
way of dressing groundless constitutional rebellion in legal
language, useful mainly as a rhetorical tool for extremists to gain
uninformed votes. 51
To J.P. Coleman, massive resistance and the extremists
who supported it posed just as much of a threat to preserving
segregation as the outside “meddlers” who were pushing blacks to
file ill-considered legal challenges to segregated schools. So long
as black activists and white extremists were allowed to operate
freely, believed Coleman, they would jeopardize the South’s
ability to preserve segregation. If, on the other hand they could be
kept in check then the federal government could be kept out of
southern affairs, allowing the races time to separate themselves.
Even if some blacks refused to remain in their own schools, he
believed, they could be thwarted quietly by redrawing school
district boundaries or even assigning students to schools according
to factors that did not refer overtly to their color. Such legalist
evasions, coupled with established racial norms, would effectively
save segregation in the state.
To drive home the damage that extremists could cause the
South, Coleman worked hard to remind white voters in Mississippi
that what the South faced in the 1950s was very much like what it
had confronted in the 1870s. Just like during Reconstruction’s
“dark days,” he claimed on statewide television in 1954, the
South’s way of life was being challenged by “individuals of whom
not a one ever lived in our state.” 52 This challenge had to be met
with the same “determination” that ex-confederates like South
Carolina governor “Wade Hampton” exhibited during their
opposition to Reconstruction following the Civil War. 53 Though
Hampton had himself been something of an extremist, Coleman
focused instead on Hampton’s loyal service to the South, arguing
that he too was deeply committed to southern traditions, arguably
51
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even more so than politically irresponsible proponents of massive
resistance. 54
Determined to avoid violent defiance, Coleman came into
direct conflict with Tom P. Brady and James O. Eastland on
December 12, 1955, when Eastland and Brady joined Mississippi
Congressman John Bell Williams in signing a resolution endorsing
nullification of the Brown ruling. 55 Nullification, which lacked
any real legal basis, closely mimicked interposition, the theory
resurrected by Virginia newspaper editor James Jackson
Kilpatrick.
To Coleman, it was nonsense. “You have probably noticed
the manifesto freely issued in recent days by Judge Brady, Senator
Eastland and Congressman Williams,” Coleman told the
Mississippi legislature on December 15, 1955, “in which these
men have advocated that the Legislature pass resolutions of
nullification of the U.S. Supreme Court decision. I am shocked
and surprised by this proposal, because history teaches in a long
succession of events that such efforts have always failed, and in
failing have brought down terrible penalties upon the heads of
those who attempted it.” 56 To avoid such penalties, which
Coleman’s study of Reconstruction made all too clear, the new
governor advocated calm. “What I want to do,” Coleman told the
state’s lawmakers, “is to preserve segregation in Mississippi. I am
not trying to grab headlines.” 57
Coleman’s mention of grabbing headlines was suggestive.
Though leaders like Eastland, Williams and Brady all proclaimed
that interposition was the best possible response to the Supreme
Court, it is possible, indeed likely that they too realized it was
constitutionally flimsy. After all, Brady was an experienced judge
and both Eastland and Williams were accomplished attorneys who
had risen to the highest ranks of American government. Their
brazen endorsement of nullification may have had less to do with
their belief that it would actually stop the Supreme Court than with
a more instrumental belief that it could be used to rally white
votes. This was certainly true of Eastland and Williams, both of
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whom relied on white voters to keep them in positions of power,
and arguably Brady as well, who later confessed to being
interested in running for governor. 58
What led to such beliefs? Why, for example, might leaders
like Brady, Eastland, and Williams all come to think that
extremism would win them votes, even though it had little chance
of actually succeeding against the Supreme Court? And how, if
they were correct, did J.P. Coleman win the governor’s race in
1955? Perhaps the best answer is that popular support for defiance
grew in direct relation to grassroots organizing by groups like the
Citizens’ Councils, who expanded rapidly across the South from
1956 to 1959. The Councils, aided by extreme segregationists like
James Jackson Kilpatrick, endorsed a program of legal defiance, or
massive resistance that they then sold to legally unsophisticated
voters as a more robust form of constitutionalism than Coleman’s
placement schemes. Indeed, prior to the rise of the Councils,
southern voters seemed relatively ambivalent about the best means
of dealing with Brown. That they overwhelmingly opposed the
ruling is relatively certain, yet many voters seemed to have been at
least open to the idea that other means of circumventing the Court
existed besides just defiance.
This was certainly true in
Mississippi, as J.P. Coleman’s victory attests, despite the fact that
it was one of the South’s most conservative, racially divided states.
Indeed, Coleman gained a certain amount of success by
distinguishing himself from Brady, Eastland, and Williams,
sometimes known as the “Little Three,” instead counseling legalist
evasion as the best means of preserving the status quo. Afraid that
defiance would compromise Mississippi’s ability to keep black
children out of white schools, for example, Coleman urged his staff
to “pour cold water on any resolution coming before the new
legislature for purposes of nullification of the Supreme Court
decision.” 59 Though Coleman derided Brady, Eastland, and
Williams’s means, he did not oppose their ends. “I don’t have one
iota of fear, he assured white Mississippians, “that we will not
have segregation continued in this state.” 60 He just did not believe
that nullification was the way to do it.
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M IS FOR MISSISSIPPI & MURDER
To J.P. Coleman, the Little Three’s move towards
nullification only worsened Mississippi’s reputation for racial
extremism, an image exacerbated by the killing of Emmett Till in
August 1955 along with a string of other murders earlier that year,
all targeting civil rights activists. The first of these happened in
May, when an African American minister named George W. Lee
was shot in his car while driving home through the small Delta
town of Belzoni. 61 Lee, a member of the NAACP, had been trying
to register black voters in Humphreys County and had ignored
white requests to refrain. 62 Ike Shelton, the local sheriff, refused
to charge anyone for the murder, stating that he could not tell
whether the shotgun pellets in Lee’s face were bullets or lead
fillings in his teeth. 63 On August 13, an African American named
Lamer Smith was killed on the lawn outside Tom P. Brady’s
courthouse in Brookhaven. 64 Smith had also been active in trying
to register black voters. Even though local police witnessed a
white man covered in blood leaving the scene of the murder, they
took days to arrest anyone. When three men were finally brought
before a grand jury, the jury refused to indict any of them,
bolstering the impression that whites in Mississippi tolerated, if not
approved, the killing of black people in the state. 65
Three weeks later, Emmett Till’s body was found. This
discovery, together with the shootings of Lee and Smith, inspired
the NAACP to release a pamphlet entitled M is for Mississippi and
Murder that called for the federal government to intervene, ending
the violence in Mississippi. 66 To fuel the fire, high ranking
officers in the NAACP made public statements decrying
Mississippi’s violent record. “It would appear from this lynching,”
announced Roy Wilkins, the NAACP’s executive secretary shortly
after the Till killing, “that the state of Mississippi has decided to
maintain white supremacy by murdering children. The killers of
the boy felt free to lynch him because there is in the entire state no
restraining influence of decency, not in the state capital, among the
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daily newspapers, the clergy nor any segment of the so-called
better citizens.” 67 Though something of an exaggeration, Roy
Wilkins realized, just as J.P. Coleman did, that white violence
could be used to draw federal intervention into the South. In fact,
two weeks after the Little Three signed their nullification
resolution, Wilkins wrote to every NAACP branch in the country
suggesting that they use the Till murder to lobby Congress into
passing legislation authorizing federal intervention in the region.
“[P]lease write without further delay to both Senators from your
state and to the Congressman from your district,” he urged
NAACP branch leaders around the country, “reminding them of
the Till murder and asking that this session of Congress pass civil
rights bills to give the Department of Justice authority to act in
such cases as the Till killing.” 68 Wilkins’s strategy, which sought
to use evidence of southern atrocities to lobby directly for
congressional intervention in the South, was remarkable. Indeed, it
suggests that at least some strategists in the early civil rights
movement were thinking about using white violence to coerce
southern compliance long before the famed direct action
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma in 1963 and 1965. Though
Wilkins certainly did not advocate direct action protest to provoke
such violence, he undoubtedly saw how white extremism could
help the black struggle. 69
J.P. Coleman also recognized how extremism, particularly
violence could help the black struggle. In fact, as early as June
1955 Coleman warned constituents that “Congress might be
inclined” to pass intrusive laws “to implement the desegregation
decision” if the South chose to pursue defiance. 70 Such an
eventuality would be disastrous, argued Coleman, given
Congress’s far-reaching powers over federal funding, interstate
commerce, and the jurisdictional reach of federal agents.
Conversely, “all the Supreme Court can do,” he maintained, “is lay
down a rule” from within the interpretation of a case, something
that did not lend itself to particularly aggressive enforcement. 71
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Roy Wilkins, perhaps even more than black legal strategists
like Thurgood Marshall, recognized that Congress, not the Court,
held the key to black freedom. In fact, three weeks after the Little
Three signed their interposition resolution, Wilkins sent Coleman a
telegram requesting that he do more for racial justice in his state.
The inspiration behind the message was a magazine article by
Alabama journalist William Bradford Huie recounting shocking
confessions by J.W. Milam and Roy Bryant to the Emmett Till
killing, making a mockery of Mississippi’s criminal justice
system. 72 Given “the admission” of Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam,
wrote Wilkins to Coleman, “the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People calls upon you to convene the
grand jury of Le Flore County for the purpose of a new
presentment of the kidnap charges against these self confessed
criminals.” 73 A new trial on the separate charge of kidnapping, not
murder, Wilkins explained, would have far-reaching effects. “If
nothing is done to make them pay for at least one of their crimes,”
lectured Wilkins, “our country will be held up for international
ridicule.” 74
That Wilkins mentioned international ridicule
suggested that he was using international politics, backlit by the
Cold War, as a means of pressuring Coleman into helping African
Americans.
Did Coleman understand, much less fear such a move? It is
almost certain that he did. After all, he had confronted just such a
threat while prosecuting Willie McGee in 1951 – even receiving
letters from officials in China and the Soviet Union. Now, Wilkins
seemed to be assuming the role of the CRC by focusing on
southern atrocities to try to force the South to change its racial
politics. To make matters worse, white extremists like Milam and
Bryant seemed to be going out of their way to disgrace the state,
further convincing Coleman of the strategic value of moderation.
During his inaugural address on January 17, 1956, Coleman
alluded to M is for Mississippi and Murder. “Despite all the
propaganda which has been fired against us,” declared the new
governor, “the country can be assured that the white people of
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Mississippi are not a race of Negro killers.” 75 No doubt realizing
that reporters from national newspapers like the New York Times
and the Chicago Daily Tribune were present, which they were,
Coleman specifically addressed audiences outside the state. “I
would like you, our friends outside Mississippi, to know,” he
continued, “that the great overwhelming majority of the white
people of Mississippi are not now guilty and never intend to be
guilty of any murder, violence, or any other wrong-doing toward
anyone.” 76 Coleman then turned to address his constituents. “We
must keep cool heads and calm judgment in the face of all the
provocation which is being hurled upon us,” he warned. 77 “[W]hile
there is no magic remedy for the Supreme Court decision there are
multiplied means and methods, all perfectly legal, by which we can
and will defeat integration of the races in our state.” 78 Coleman’s
allusion to multiplied means and methods, all perfectly legal, stood
in stark contrast to Brady, Eastland, and Williams’s declaration of
nullification, and even to his own pressured endorsement of
interposition. It was a call for evasion, not extremism and it
illustrated Coleman’s conviction that the best way of preventing
integration was through legalist means.
Roy Wilkins took issue with Coleman’s suggestion that he
and activists like him were using white atrocities to force political
change, even mentioning the word “provocation.” 79 Outraged that
Coleman would try to pin racial unrest on “provocation” by civil
rights groups, Wilkins wrote the new governor inquiring about the
murder of an African American named Clinton Melton on
December 3, 1955 in Glendora, Mississippi. 80 According to
Wilkins, the NAACP had purposely not intervened in the case
precisely because it hoped that Mississippi authorities might
prosecute the killer, Elmore Otis Kimball, who had been identified
by three witnesses. 81 Despite the absence of such NAACP
“interference” however, an all white jury still refused to convict. 82
To Wilkins, this meant that Mississippi was “unwilling to
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administer justice” in cases where African Americans were killed
by whites, thereby validating the NAACP’s push for “Federal
intervention to uphold justice.” 83
Rather than respond directly to Wilkins’s threat, Coleman
chose a more evasive tactic, actively discouraging civil rights
activists like the NAACP leader from visiting Mississippi. On
April 27, 1956 for example, Coleman wired Adam Clayton Powell,
a prominent black congressman from New York and Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., an increasingly prominent black minister in
Montgomery, requesting that they stay out of the state. 84 Citing
his “duty” as governor of Mississippi, Coleman alerted both men
to the fact that conditions in Mississippi were “more tranquil than
at any time in recent months” and that their appearance in the state
would be “a great disservice to our Negro people.” 85 In a prepared
statement issued to the public, Coleman went even further, calling
both King and Powell “professional agitators” akin to the
“carpetbaggers” and “scalawags” who corrupted southern politics
after the Civil War. 86 Both had been invited to speak at a meeting
in Jackson sponsored by an organization called the Regional
Council of Negro Leadership (RCNL). 87 King, in particular,
worried Coleman due to his charismatic leadership of a massive
bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama that had begun in December
1955 and was still in full swing during the spring of 1956. Seeing
the avalanche of negative press the boycott generated for Alabama
authorities, not to mention the greater outpouring of sympathy it
generated for the black struggle, Coleman recognized that a similar
conflagration in Mississippi might compromise his plans for
peaceful evasion of Brown. Interestingly, both King and Powell
complied with Coleman’s request, asserting that they had never
planned to take up the RCNL’s invitation anyway. 88 While might
have been true, the RCNL still chafed at the governor’s move and
83
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attacked him for trying to project a façade of tranquility in the
state. “The effort being put forth by Governor J.P. Coleman to
give the outside world the impression that there is a tranquil state
of race relations in Mississippi” must be challenged, lamented the
RCNL at its annual meeting in Jackson in April. “As long as the
986,000 Negroes in Mississippi are denied their God given
American rights in the field of Education, voting and justice, there
will be no tranquil era in Mississippi.” 89
J.P. Coleman sought to prove otherwise. In order to bolster
an image of tranquility in Mississippi, he called for measures far
beyond polite requests that civil rights activists stay home. Among
these were innovations in the state’s law enforcement and criminal
justice system. During his inaugural address, for example, he
promised that “the full weight of the government will unfailingly
be used to the end that Mississippi will be a State of law and not of
violence.” 90 Acknowledging the negative implications of poor law
enforcement like that demonstrated by the sheriffs in Belzoni and
Brookhaven, Coleman admonished those in positions of power to
conduct government on “a high plane of service, economy, and
stability.” 91 High enough, he continued, to “leave no doubt” that
Mississippi was “an outstanding, safe place” where outside
investors would feel comfortable “to locate and operate,” and
where all citizens would receive “fair and equitable treatment
under fair and just laws.” 92 It was a big promise, one that sought
to reassure the nation that Mississippi was in fact committed to
peace through the centralization law enforcement. Coleman knew,
for example, that one of the weakest links in Mississippi’s law
enforcement machinery was the local discretion of elected sheriffs
who had little interest in presenting a moderate image to the nation
or the world, particularly when such an image did not help them in
local reelection campaigns.

CENTRALIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT
Convinced that Mississippi needed to reign in violence and
bolster lawfulness, Coleman made reforming the state’s criminal
justice system a central part of his administration. “I shall at the
first appropriate opportunity,” he announced during his inaugural
address, for example, “deliver a special message to the Legislature
89
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on the necessity of strengthening and improving all phases of our
law enforcement machinery.” 93 Mississippi’s law enforcement
machinery, up to that point, was controlled largely at the local
level, which gave the state little power to prevent the type of local
defiance dramatized in M is for Mississippi and Murder. To
ameliorate this, Coleman advocated several limitations on local
power. One was an unprecedented procedure through which
locally appointed authorities and police could be recalled by
popular vote. 94 Thirty percent of the voters of any county could,
under Coleman’s proposed bill, request by petition a recall election
of a county official, while fifty-one percent could recall a police
officer. 95 Once such a recall petition was made, a Governorappointed Chancery Court would be assigned the duty of deciding
whether the official or police officer should remain in office. 96 By
allowing the state to take a hand in local law enforcement, the bill
defied what one newspaper called Mississippi’s traditional “hands
off policy when it came to ‘interfering’ in local affairs.” 97
To further control local affairs, Coleman increased state
regulation of local Justices of the Peace. Such justices, elected by
county, handled the vast majority of criminal cases in Mississippi
at the time, yet often possessed little or no legal training. They
became notorious in Mississippi for charging exorbitant court fees,
as well as unreasonable fines for traffic violations and other petty
crimes. 98 Part of this stemmed from the fact that they were paid a
percentage of the fees they charged, a situation inviting corruption.
J.P. Coleman made it a goal of his administration to end this
corruption and modernize the JP system. “Justices of the peace
who want to do right have no need to fear,” declared the Governor
in 1956, “but if JP’s resist efforts to improve and modernize their
offices, it could result in abolition of the JP court system, and they
will have brought it on themselves.” 99
To further limit local autonomy and centralize power,
Coleman strengthened the state highway patrol. Because state
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troopers answered directly to him, they provided Coleman with a
law enforcement mechanism capable of overriding local sheriffs
and intervening in local affairs. In order to expand their power,
Coleman initiated a substantial reorganization of the patrol as well
as an overall increase in its numbers. To fund this increase he
recommended and succeeded in obtaining increases in both tag and
drivers’ license fees throughout the state. As he explained many
years later, his changes in the highway patrol would have direct
implications for the relationship between Jackson and other parts
of the state, particularly the Citizens’ Councils’ headquarters, the
Delta. “For years and years,” explained Coleman later, “the
Mississippi Delta . . . was a fiefdom of its own. They didn’t want
anybody messing with their business; they ran their own affairs . . .
and they just wouldn’t permit any – they wouldn’t even talk about
having – state police.” 100 The Delta’s aversion to state police
stemmed from a remarkable state tradition of localism in law
enforcement. Though troopers had long existed in Mississippi,
they lacked general jurisdiction and were limited largely to
patrolling highways. This meant that local law enforcement
officers, particularly sheriffs, possessed almost complete autonomy
in their counties, a situation that led to a type of decentralized law
enforcement where local police could essentially decide what laws
to enforce and what to ignore. Because state troopers worked for
the governor, any expansion in their jurisdiction or size meant a
potential threat to this arrangement since they might be sent to
rural counties to enforce state laws independent of local approval.
This threat was exacerbated by the fact that many sheriffs made
considerable amounts of money by agreeing to turn a blind eye to
criminal activity, particularly violations of the state’s prohibition
against alcohol, a practice that they did not want state troopers to
interfere with. To limit outside intervention and preserve their
own autonomy, Mississippi sheriffs lobbied heavily in the state
House and Senate, both forums where they hoped to resist any
centralization of law enforcement statewide. 101
Though omnipotent at home, rural sheriffs proved
ineffectual in the state capitol. Fears stirred by Brown seemed to
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temporarily override Mississippi’s law enforcement localism,
creating a situation in which state legislators proved willing to
enact Coleman’s laws augmenting the authority of state police.
This, of course, suggests that Brown did not just incite extremism,
but galvanized southern state lawmaking, uniting legislators
around the central goal of preserving segregation. For southern
governors with a strategic sensibility like Coleman, this created a
window of opportunity to present aggressive packages of
legislation that were then accepted with relatively little resistance.
Though legislators still made the law, of course, Brown enabled
Coleman to exercise a remarkable degree of political leadership
over the legislative process. 102
Enhancing the reach of Mississippi’s state troopers was not
the only part of Coleman’s plan that he pushed through the state’s
legislative process. In fact, the most remarkable measure that he
endorsed was the creation of a state agency called the Mississippi
Sovereignty Commission.
The Sovereignty Commission,
established by statute in 1956, was an executive agency charged
with using “any lawful, peaceful and constitutional means” to
prevent implementation of Brown. 103 It possessed police powers
as well as adjudicatory capabilities. For example, members of the
Sovereignty Commission could subpoena witnesses and also
require production of private “books, records, papers or
documents.” 104 Refusal to produce such evidence could result in
imprisonment. Similarly, the commission had the power to use the
Hinds County chancery court in Jackson “to enforce obedience to
any process issued by it” and was further granted broad
investigatory powers to look into the records of individuals,
corporate entities and political groups. Finally, the Sovereignty
Commission even possessed a propaganda wing dedicated to
improving Mississippi’s image nationally.105
Impressive in scope, the Sovereignty Commission became
an integral part of J.P. Coleman’s strategy for maintaining
102
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segregation – and tranquility – in Mississippi. Interestingly, it
helped him to control both civil rights activists and white
extremists. In the spring of 1958, for example, the Commission
became actively involved in thwarting a Citizens’ Council attempt
to have NAACP officers Medgar Evers and Roy Wilkins arrested.
On the afternoon of May 18, 1959, Evers, the head of the
NAACP’s Mississippi branch, and Wilkins, visiting from New
York, were scheduled to speak at a black Masonic Lodge in
Jackson. The speeches had been planned months in advance as
part of a larger attempt to rally black support for civil rights in the
state. Prior to the commencement of the speech, Attorney General
Joseph T. Patterson and Zack Van Landingham, a Sovereignty
Commission investigator, drove to the Lodge “to observe just what
appeared to be going on.” 106 Once there, the Jackson Police
Department’s Chief of Detectives Meady Pierce approached them,
complaining that the Citizens’ Councils had attempted to sabotage
the meeting. “You know what some damn fools have done?”
Pierce exclaimed to Patterson and Van Landingham, “They have
gone and gotten out warrants for Roy Wilkins and Medgar
Evers.” 107
Upon investigation, Patterson and Van Landingham
discovered that the Citizens’ Councils, convinced that “Governor
Coleman and State authorities were afraid of Roy Wilkins and
Medgar Evers,” had obtained a warrant from a sympathetic Justice
of the Peace to arrest the two civil rights leaders. 108 In an effort to
derail the Councils’ strategy, Attorney General Patterson contacted
Dick King, a high-ranking Council official, and warned him that
arresting the two high-profile Civil Rights Leaders would not aid
the cause of white supremacy in the state. “It would be a grave
mistake to arrest Wilkins and Evers,” Patterson told King,
“because of the national publicity that would follow.” 109 Van
Landingham then contacted Louis Hollis, Director of the
Mississippi Citizens’ Council, warning him that the arrests would
be bad for Mississippi. While Governor Coleman hurried back to
Jackson from a graduation speech in Goodman to deal with the
crisis, Hollis followed Van Landingham’s advice, contacted other
influential Council members in the state and conveyed to them his
discussion with the Sovereignty Commission. By the time of the
scheduled speeches, the Councils had withdrawn their warrant. 110
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Not only did Coleman’s Sovereignty Commission control
white extremists, it also curtailed civil rights activists. One method
that the Commission deployed to do this was police surveillance.
To take just one example, almost one year before the Sovereignty
Commission saved Medgar Evers from arrest, the Commission
began tracking his movements around the state. “At the meeting of
the State Sovereignty Commission on November 20, 1958,” read
the minutes of one Sovereignty Commission meeting, “Governor
Coleman suggested that spot checks be made of the activities of
Medgar Evers, both day and night, to determine whether he is
violating any laws.” 111 That Coleman ordered the Sovereignty
Commission to ensnare Medgar Evers in the violation of petty laws
yet shied away from his outright arrest at a public speech appears,
on the surface, to be paradoxical. Yet, it hints at the deeper logic
behind J.P. Coleman’s larger civil rights strategy. Afraid of
appearing to be a racial extremist, he had no qualms about
appearing tough on law enforcement, particularly if such
enforcement happened to ensnare civil rights activists.
Coleman ordered a particularly bold display of law
enforcement power in June 1958, when an African American
named Clennon King tried to enroll in summer school at the
University of Mississippi. 112 While King, a 37-year-old former
professor had little trouble entering campus, he encountered
problems when he joined the line to register. Robert Ellis, a
university registrar, invited King to his office and promptly asked
him to leave. King refused, only to find state troopers waiting for
him inside. The officers arrested him, carried him bodily to a
waiting car and then drove him to headquarters where Public
Safety Commissioner Tom Scarborough, at Coleman’s request,
ordered King examined by psychiatrists. 113
Based on the
examination, a state judge ordered King committed to a state
mental hospital. Governor Coleman, who orchestrated King’s
commitment, later told a press conference that the activist would
either be confined to a mental hospital or tried for resisting arrest
and disturbing the peace. 114
Coleman’s neutralization of Clennon King showcased his
penchant for shrewd state action. While King clearly had no
mental problems, his quick examination and commitment
precluded events from escalating to a riot, as they did at Ole Miss
four years later in 1962. Of course, King’s story still made it into
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northern newspapers like the New York Times, but it failed to make
the first page. 115 Coleman, through his deft handling of state
police and Sovereignty Commission agents, displayed a knack for
quietly diffusing black protest. Interestingly, he would refine this
ability even more as his agents undertook the manipulation of
black leaders themselves to help prevent integration in Mississippi.

RECRUITING BLACK INFORMANTS
On May 15, 1956, J.P. Coleman declared that it was time
for the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission to bring itself
into “full effect and fruition” by taking two final steps towards
expanding its power. 116 Specifically, the Commission decided to
allocate state funds to “buy information” from civil rights activists
and, concomitantly, to hire black secret agents to serve as the
Commission’s “eyes and ears” in African American
communities. 117 In addition to tracking civil rights activists like
Medgar Evers through conventional police tactics, the Sovereignty
Commission also sought black agents to guide it through black
political networks that were otherwise hidden from white view.
These agents were usually older, middle class African Americans
who held prestigious positions in black colleges and schools and
feared, correctly, that integration could lead them to lose their jobs.
Once on the Sovereignty Commission’s payroll they performed a
variety of tasks, among them reporting civil rights activity in their
communities as well as intervening directly to diffuse civil rights
protest. 118
For example, on December 10, 1957, the Sovereignty
Commission’s Public Relations Director Hall DeCell reported to
Governor Coleman on a meeting in Clarksdale of the Regional
Council of Negro Leadership, the same group that had invited
Martin Luther King and Adam Clayton Powell to Jackson in 1956.
“We had the meeting well covered with some of our Negro
friends,” asserted DeCell, referring to black informers employed
by the Commission, “and will have by the latter part of this week,
a complete typewritten report on what went on.” 119 That Coleman
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was getting typewritten reports of RCNL meetings was
remarkable. The RCNL, unlike the NAACP, was a relatively
isolated, local organization. That the governor was reading their
minutes suggests a relatively high level of both state surveillance,
and intrusion, into black affairs. It also helps to explain how
Coleman knew, for example, that Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Adam Clayton Powell were scheduled to speak in Jackson,
prompting a hasty move by the governor to contact each leader and
dissuade them from visiting the state.
While legal segregation kept the races apart, Coleman’s
Sovereignty Commission enabled him to get inside black civil
rights circles. Further, the type of information furnished by the
Commission helped give Coleman a sense of what parts of the
state might need particular attention. In August 1956, for example,
Coleman received assurance from a Sovereignty Commission
agent named William Liston that whites in Yazoo City were
working together with black agents to quell civil rights activity
themselves, independent of state help. For example, Liston noted
that one black agent named Fred W. Young had called a “meeting
of all the Negro teachers” in Yazoo City and warned them that “the
fastest way for them to lose the proposed new Negro schools
would be for them to engage in N.A.A.C.P. activities.” 120 That
African Americans were being offered new schools, and that black
agents were being used to sell such schools, helps explain the
extent to which Coleman endorsed a moderate approach to
resisting Brown, one that rewarded at the same time as it pressured
blacks.
While Coleman’s willingness to fund black schools was
clearly designed to forestall integration, it was also indicative of a
larger, perhaps unexpected effect of Brown. As much as Brown
seemed to pit the races against each other, for example, it also
brought moderates of both races closer together, usually by
encouraging them to meet and forge compromises. 121 For
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example, white moderates throughout Mississippi worked hard to
form interracial organizations, or committees, precisely so that
black and white leaders could sit down and negotiate deals in lieu
of integrating. One such committee in Mississippi drew attention
to itself in the summer of 1956, for example, when Liston reported
on civil rights in Vicksburg. According to him, an “inter-racial
Committee on Race Relations” composed of “outstanding and
rational members of both races” had worked successfully through
negotiation and mediation to “control extremists on both sides.”122
One member of said committee, J.H. White, gained particular
praise from Liston for his openness to negotiating with whites, a
willingness that might have stemmed from the fact that he was also
president of then all-black Mississippi Vocational College. 123
To Roy Wilkins, over a thousand miles away in New York,
such black cooperation was lamentable. “Over in Soviet Russia,”
exclaimed Wilkins during a speech on June 3, 1956, “they had a
system of paying children to spy on their parents,” now
Mississippi, in his opinion, was doing the same thing. 124 “Spies
will tell who smiled at a Negro yesterday,” he lamented, “or what
Negro said he was sick of Jim Crow, or what tired Negro woman
said she wished she did not have to stand up while white men sat in
the bus.” 125 While black collaboration clearly bothered Wilkins,
there was not much he could do to stop it. In fact, some NAACP
members in Mississippi even pressured him, threatening to switch
sides and work for whites if he did not comply with their demands.
One such mercenary was Gus Courts, a black activist who was shot
by a white racist in his own grocery store in Belzoni, Mississippi in
1955. Unable to find work, Courts accepted money from the
NAACP in exchange for delivering speeches and testifying in
favor of civil rights legislation in Congress. By April 1957,
however, that money had begun to run out, prompting Courts to
ask Wilkins for more.
Aware of his potential value to
segregationists, Courts threatened Wilkins that if the NAACP did
not send him $1,500 for a new store, he would switch sides and
work for J.P. Coleman. “Must I go back to Mississippi, denounce
the N.A.A.C.P. and accept the offers of the South?” Courts wrote
Wilkins, “I could have avoided all this by accepting the offers of
the Southern Whites but I chose to stand by the N.A.A.C.P. and its
122
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program upon its promises.” 126 Courts, perhaps because he was
the victim of a relatively sensational crime, proved too valuable a
spokesperson for the NAACP to lose. Wilkins sent him the money
a week later. 127
Roy Wilkins’s willingness to pay Gus Courts cash in
exchange for making speeches against white southerners indicated
the depth of his commitment to winning a constitutional struggle
against the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission, and J.P.
Coleman, on a playing field far removed from the federal courts.
Though NAACP lawyers like Thurgood Marshall certainly became
better known as crusaders for Brown, Wilkins was still very much
involved in the fight, albeit in a more subtle type of propaganda
struggle that involved the manipulation of hearts and minds. The
goal of this struggle was to build popular support, and ultimately
congressional and executive resolve, for coercing compliance with
Brown in the South. The primary opponents of the NAACP in this
struggle were southern moderates like Coleman, not white
extremists like Eastland or Brady. If anything, Eastland and Brady
only helped the NAACP by discrediting the South with their
absurd declarations of defiance against the Supreme Court,
coupled with their ridiculous claims that integration would lead to
mongrelization and civilizational collapse. Rather than fear them,
NAACP agents sought to actually increase the illusion of their
influence. On April 29, 1956, for example, A.M. Mackel, a
NAACP member from Natchez, Mississippi, wrote a letter to Roy
Wilkins suggesting that they infiltrate the Citizens’ Councils with
agents appearing to be white extremists. “A friend of mine,” wrote
Mackel, “said we should infiltrate the Councils with the same type
of propaganda they are putting on us.” 128 Interestingly, Mackel
suggested that the infiltrators pretend they were outspoken
extremists, damaging the Councils’ image by making “a few
‘Hitler’ speeches.” 129 Though such proposals were not acted on,
the manner in which they emerged reveal the extent to which the
battle over Brown bled into ideological terrain. Long before young
black activists in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference or
the Congress of Racial Equality used direct action to win hearts
and minds nationally, leaders of the NAACP used other tactics,
like the payment of black agents like Mackel and Courts, to
achieve a similar end.
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To the chagrin of the NAACP, established black leaders
often refused to cooperate with NAACP plans, even petitioning to
work for Coleman’s administration. On November 13, 1958, for
example, a black school supervisor named B.L. Bell wrote to
Governor Coleman requesting employment with the Sovereignty
Commission. 130 Coleman ordered the Commission to conduct an
investigation of Bell to determine his reliability and influence.
This process included an interview, during which Bell “furnished
considerable information and names of individuals in Bolivar
County whom he stated were members of the NAACP.” 131 After
conducting his investigation, a white Sovereignty Commission
agent concluded that hiring Bell “has some merit.” 132 He
recommended paying Bell “$50 a month for a period of 3 months,”
noting that during this time Bell could monitor civil rights activity
in the state, and then “furnish any worthwhile information” to the
Commission. 133
Political pragmatism, coupled with economic incentives,
accounted for much of the Sovereignty Commission’s success in
attracting black agents. Informants sought money or services in
exchange for cooperation. A dramatic example of this occurred
when a black man named Clyde Kennard applied for admission to
Mississippi Southern, an all white college in Hattiesburg.
Kennard, a former paratrooper, applied to enter the school in the
fall of 1959. 134 The Sovereignty Commission devised a variety of
plans to thwart him, none involving dramatic confrontations or
violence. One such plan was a full-scale investigation of
Kennard’s past, including anything that could be used to disqualify
him, including bad credit, bad moral character, and criminal
violations. In pursuit of this end, the commission deployed
investigators to search through Kennard’s past work record, his
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past school records, and even vital statistics on his parents’
marriage. 135
The Commission also recruited a taskforce of black
ministers and educators to discourage Kennard from submitting his
application. As one Commission investigator wrote, “[I]t was
suggested to these individuals that since they were leaders of their
race in the community and since they were in favor of maintaining
segregated schools, that it might serve a useful purpose if they
would constitute themselves as a committee to call on Clyde
Kennard and persuade him that it was for the best interest of all
concerned that he withdraw and desist from filing an application
for admission to Mississippi Southern College.” 136 In exchange
for their betrayal of Kennard, the black ministers and educators
gave the Sovereignty Commission an implicit list of demands, not
least of which was the construction of an all black junior college in
Hattiesburg. “It is interesting to note,” continued the Sovereignty
Commission report, “that all three of the Negro educators when
interviewed on separate occasions, brought into the conversation
their need for a Negro Junior College in [Hattiesburg]. The
inference was inescapable that they were attempting to bargain in a
subtle manner.” 137
One of the more skillful bargainers was J.H. White, the
same individual who had been recommended to the commission
for helping subvert civil rights in Vicksburg. To avert a crisis at
Mississippi Southern, White suggested that the Sovereignty
Commission order the college’s president Dr. McCain to find some
way of bringing Kennard to Jackson where, by apparent accident
he could run into Governor Coleman. An impromptu meeting with
Coleman, argued White, would appease Kennard (who, according
to White only wanted attention), especially if the Governor
promised an all black college in Hattiesburg. 138
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J.H. White’s not-so-subtle insistence on a black college in
Hattiesburg provides a glimpse into the type of real politik that
permeated race relations in Mississippi in the 1950s. Rather than
unsuspecting Uncle Toms, the black employees of the Sovereignty
Commission banked on the hope that by aligning themselves with
the state they could preserve their jobs as well as gain benefits for
both themselves and the black community. The NAACP, to many
of them, was an alien, arguably even reckless organization. Not
only did it risk provoking a white crackdown, but it also
represented a challenge to local black power. Instead of embracing
the civil rights organization, at least some black leaders opted to go
around it, engaging in accommodation with white authorities.
Precisely because he was willing to engage in
accommodation, Coleman’s extensive use of black informers
helped him preempt direct action protest and arguably subvert civil
rights activism in the state. At the very least, it helped him pierce
the otherwise opaque veil that hid black political organizing from
white officials. Black agents became the state’s eyes and ears,
enabling Coleman and his Sovereignty Commission to intervene
directly in the lives of local people engaged in political protest at
the grassroots level.
Of course, violence remained a constant threat to black
activism in Mississippi. Yet, as activists-for-hire like Gus Courts
illustrate, white violence had a certain perverse currency in the
civil rights world. While it clearly threatened black lives, it also
helped the black cause, providing the NAACP with clear evidence
that segregation was far from the system of “peaceable”
government that J.P. Coleman tried to project. Interestingly, this
led Coleman to rail against the manner in which the NAACP
paraded victims of white violence like Courts around the country,
trying to win sympathy for the black cause. In fact, in March
1957, Coleman even traveled to Washington to testify against
Wilkins before a United States Senate Subcommittee. The
occasion for the testimony was a civil rights bill, precisely the kind
of federal intervention that Coleman had feared might happen if
the South did not feign compliance with Brown.
Committed to equating Mississippi with Murder, Roy
Wilkins told the Senate Subcommittee how Gus Courts had been
“shot and seriously wounded” by a white man in his own store in
Belzoni, Mississippi, simply for trying to vote. 139 Such acts of
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racial violence, lamented Wilkins, were not being solved by local
authorities and required federal action. Coleman, who had of
course been trying to improve Mississippi’s criminal justice system
precisely to avoid such eventualities, testified that accounts of
racial violence in Mississippi, including Courts’s shooting, were
exaggerated. 140 Complaining that Mississippi had become a
“whipping boy,” Coleman told the Subcommittee that only four
African Americans were killed by whites in 1955, while one
White
hundred fifty-nine blacks “killed each other.” 141
Mississippians, he testified, “do not deserve a blanket indictment
just because there were 4 Negroes killed by the whites in that State
in 1955, while the Negroes were busily engaged in killing 159 of
their own number.” 142 Coleman’s message tried to downplay the
rate of racially motivated white on black murders in the state by
emphasizing black on black crime. This emphasis on black
criminality represented a new way of deflecting attention from
racially motivated killings, not to mention the shortcomings of
local law enforcement. Of course, Coleman did not mention that
he was, at that very moment, engaged in the process of trying to
improve such law enforcement. Perhaps he felt that such a
concession would lend credence to Wilkins’s point. Instead, he
attacked the manner in which the NAACP used white on black
killings as chess pieces in “national politics.” 143 Meanwhile, he
blasted Wilkins for not mentioning black on black murders,
presumably because they were not as politically relevant. 144
Trying to paint Wilkins as a propagandist, Coleman struggled to
reassure the Subcommittee that federal legislation would not “aid
the Negro” at all, so much as become a “continuous source of
agitation, uproar, tumult, and domestic discord.” 145 Here we catch
a glimpse of the manner in which Coleman perceived civil rights
gains to jeopardize larger state interests, most notably the
preservation of peace and tranquility. Here also we see evidence
of the manner in which Coleman and Wilkins fought publicly over
whether federal intervention should be increased in the state, long
before the direct action campaigns of 1963 and 1965.
Despite his best efforts, Coleman’s testimony did not
prevent the enactment of a 1957 Civil Rights Act. Desperate to get
some kind of civil rights legislation passed, Lyndon Johnson, with
140
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an eye the Presidency, made a series of compromises to push the
bill through. Though weakened by concessions, the act reaffirmed
Coleman’s conviction that white violence could be used
strategically by civil rights groups to win more robust federal
enforcement of Brown.

MACK CHARLES PARKER
In April 1959, during Coleman’s final year in office, an
African American named Mack Charles Parker was kidnapped
from jail in Poplarville, tortured, killed and left floating in the
Pearl River. Four years had passed since the lynching of Emmett
Till and, although there had been a lull in racial violence, Parker’s
murder stirred old fears, particularly in J.P. Coleman. 146 To the
governor, Parker’s murder created yet another opportunity for civil
rights groups like the NAACP to generate negative propaganda
favoring more aggressive federal legislation in the South. Already,
the Senate Judiciary Committee was conducting hearings on a
second proposed civil rights bill – one that Coleman wanted
desperately to stop. Parker’s murder, Coleman feared, would add
momentum to the bill, particularly because it involved the flagrant
kidnapping of a prisoner from a county jail. This brazen act of
defiance, Coleman feared, would bolster longstanding NAACP
claims that racial violence was tacitly sanctioned by southern state
officials, a claim that, if true, bolstered the case for federal
intervention in the region.
Coleman also feared that Parker’s killing could destabilize
a precarious equilibrium between moderate strategies of resistance
to Brown and the Supreme Court. Since the murder of Emmett
Till, for example, there had not been one case of integration in the
state. In fact, in 1958 the Supreme Court had even invalidated
massive resistance and tentatively endorsed pupil placement, two
developments that boded well for Coleman’s moderate
approach. 147 Of course, if the Court began to suspect that national
support for aggressive enforcement of civil rights in Mississippi
was growing, then it might feel pressure to revisit placement plans
and perhaps even invalidate them. Coleman, naturally, did not
want this to happen. In many ways, he stood on the verge of
victory over both the NAACP and the Citizens’ Councils, a
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position that drove him to take a particularly adamant stance
against the vigilante killing of Mack Charles Parker. 148
In a controversial move that sought to preempt the
NAACP’s demands for federal intervention in the South, Coleman
requested that the federal government intervene in the case, even
inviting the FBI to investigate the Parker kidnapping and murder.
He also wrote a letter to southern governors asking them to join
him in a conference to “come up with the best possible solution”
for preventing similar acts of racial violence in the future. 149 Such
a meeting, he hoped, would send a clear message to the country
that southern officials did not endorse racial violence, hopefully
deflecting any negative publicity created by the crime.
Interestingly, southern governors disagreed over whether
such a stance was necessary. Some, like Virginia Governor
Lindsay Almond supported Coleman’s proposal. “I share your
view,” wrote Almond, “that the time is now for the Governors of
the southern states to sit down in conference and discuss this
matter, resolving our views to the end that law and order shall and
must prevail throughout the Southland.” 150 Other governors,
however, declined. “Without second, sober thought,” noted South
Carolina Governor Ernest F. Hollings, “my immediate reaction is
‘no.’” 151 According to Hollings, the furor over the Parker killing
was “not near so bad as your letter indicates” and a top level
meeting of southern governors would only “give credence” to
allegations by civil rights groups like the NAACP that “something
really is wrong with the South.” 152
Hollings’s response was arguably naïve. By refusing to
meet, he and other governors were probably only giving the
NAACP more opportunities to make the South look recalcitrant.
Of course, not all southern governors understood as well as
Coleman just how determined black activists were to use white
violence to their own advantage. In fact, the divergence of opinion
between Hollings and Almond was indicative of a larger rift
forming between southern leaders at the time. To most, like
Almond, the days of massive resistance were over and a new era of
resistance was beginning, one in which the South needed to pursue
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legalist evasion, meanwhile taking aggressive action to control
racial violence and project a positive national image. To others,
however, defiance was still desirable, if for no other reason than it
won votes. Hollings, for example, had just won a battle against
University of South Carolina president Donald Russell in 1958
precisely by blasting him for being soft on segregation. 153 Now,
he made a point to reject Coleman’s meeting, perhaps fearing that
it could be taken as a concession to the NAACP.
Disappointed, Coleman traveled to Washington to testify
against the second federal civil rights bill in three years,
meanwhile finding himself bombarded by questions about Mack
Charles Parker. “How [did] they get the key?” asked Colorado
Senator John A. Carroll, referring to the manner in which the mob
gained access to the prisoner, “Was there a conspiracy on the part
of the bailiff or the jailers?” 154
H. Slayman, Jr., the
subcommittee’s chief counsel, asked Coleman why a grand jury
hearing to indict the suspects would not be held until November, a
delay that Coleman attributed to scheduling. Questions continued,
revolving around black voting rights, black rights to jury trials, and
even whether the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission was
involved. Coleman tried desperately to bring the focus of the
committee back to the proposed civil rights bill, but with little
success. He ended up making a somewhat futile reference to the
degree of support that he had received among African Americans
in Mississippi for the public schools he had built – a non sequitur
that had little to do with the subcommittee’s main topic of
interest. 155
Despite frustrations like the one he encountered in
Washington in May 1959, J.P. Coleman’s four years in office
proved remarkably successful. He managed to push key pieces of
legislation through the Mississippi House and Senate, increasing
the centralized power of the state’s law enforcement capabilities,
meanwhile providing local officials with opportunities to keep
black children out of white schools. Coleman also enjoyed a
considerable amount of success in neutralizing potentially
combustible racial protests. He subverted Clyde Kennard and
Clennon King, both applicants to Mississippi Universities who
could arguably have triggered riots. He also worked hard to keep
outside activists like Martin Luther King, Jr. out of the state, to buy
information, and to rein in local sheriffs and justices of the peace.
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Perhaps Coleman’s biggest failure lay in his inability to
retain the confidence of white voters.
Despite the many
accomplishments of his administration, white voters replaced him
with an outspoken segregationist and Citizens’ Councils member
named Ross Barnett in 1960. 156 While Barnett would go on to
obscure many of the gains that Coleman made by fueling both
violence and extremism in the state, he would only survive one
term. 157 Indeed, as the next section will show, Coleman would
have the final say when his old friend Lyndon Johnson appointed
him to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1965.

SHAVED HEAD & MOONSHINE
Only weeks after President Johnson signed a historic
Voting Rights Act into law in August 1965, he appointed J.P.
Coleman to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the time, the
Fifth Circuit had become celebrated for pro-civil rights opinions
thanks to Republican Judges John Minor Wisdom and Elbert
Tuttle. Tuttle had even confronted allegations of corruption for
assigning civil rights cases to liberal judges, meanwhile keeping
them out of the hands of reactionaries like Mississippi Judge Ben
Cameron. In the spring of 1965 Cameron died, leaving a seat on
the court open. While Johnson could theoretically have appointed
anyone he wanted to the court, including a liberal on civil rights
issues, he chose Coleman.
Why? Perhaps the best reason was electoral politics.
Coleman had endorsed Johnson in 1964 and both Johnson and
Kennedy in the 1960 presidential elections. He also enjoyed the
endorsement of powerful southern congressional leaders like
Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland, who put any disagreement
that he might have had with Coleman on hold. Even Robert
Kennedy, who knew that Coleman had helped elect his brother
president, lobbied for the former Mississippi Governor. Finally,
Johnson, who at that point was still considering a second bid for
the Presidency in 1968, was arguably reluctant to appoint a liberal
to the Fifth Circuit, knowing that such a decision might jeopardize
his chances of winning southern support at the polls.
Not surprisingly, Coleman’s appointment, a fairly bold
move considering his segregationist credentials, proved
controversial. During two days of hearings before a special
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, opponents to
Coleman’s nomination presented a litany of reasons why he should
not be appointed to the federal judiciary. To take just a few
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examples, John Conyers, an African American representative from
Michigan, testified against Coleman, calling him a “calculated
legal technician” who had manipulated “the judicial process in
order to protect a racist social order” in Mississippi. 158 John
Lewis, Chairman of the Student Non-violent Coordinating
Committee, or SNCC, called Coleman’s appointment “an affront
and an insult” to African Americans. 159 Even Martin Luther King,
Jr. prepared a statement in opposition to Coleman’s nomination,
noting that the Fifth Circuit had “been the major constitutional
body to which Negroes might turn in the South” and that
appointing Coleman to the court would be a setback for the
movement. 160 It would be “a great tragedy” to put Coleman on the
Fifth Circuit, argued King, particularly given the type of politics
“practiced by Gov. Coleman during his years as the architect of
Mississippi’s plans to circumvent the orders of the very Court to
which he now seeks appointment.” 161
Despite King’s protests, Coleman won Senate approval and
used his new position on the Fifth Circuit to continue the trajectory
that he had begun as governor, limiting violence and improving
legal process. 162 In a consolidation of cases decided in October
1966, Coleman voted to allow civil rights activists facing trial in
Mississippi a chance to present evidence in federal district court to
the effect that their arrests had been racially motivated. If they
could prove this was the case, held Coleman, then they should be
released. 163 Four months later, Coleman decided two cases, one in
which members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
(MFDP) had been arrested for distributing leaflets in violation of
an anti-leafleting ordinance and another in which MFDP members
had been arrested for marching in violation of traffic regulations.
In both cases, Coleman ruled the ordinances unconstitutionally
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vague, particularly for the manner in which they threatened free
speech. 164 Not long thereafter, Coleman confronted an appeal by
William Eaton and Collie Wilkins, Jr., two white Alabamans found
guilty of murdering Viola Liuzzo, a white mother of five who had
traveled south to participate in a massive civil rights march from
Selma to Montgomery. 165 Rejecting their argument that they
should have been tried in state and not federal court, Coleman read
into their crime a deprivation of Luizzo’s right to participate in
federal elections thereby securing their convictions. 166
Such rulings coincided nicely with Coleman’s longstanding
interest in controlling extremism, curtailing violence, and
improving legal process. They also set the stage for a series of
rulings that would gradually align federal law against civil rights
demonstrators. In May 1969, for example, Coleman wrote the
majority opinion in a case brought by black demonstrators arrested
for picketing in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
Specifically, the
demonstrators appealed an injunction, issued by a district judge
and outspoken segregationist named Harold Cox, which allowed
the demonstrators to picket, but limited them to six per location,
demanded they remain at least five feet apart, and required them to
remain absolutely silent. 167 Coleman, upon reviewing the record,
determined that the picketers were in fact attempting to provoke
violence by singing “freedom songs” that included “words of a
generally threatening nature.” 168 Noting that the Constitution
prohibited the state from silencing protesters completely, however,
Coleman modified the injunction to prohibit speech “clearly
calculated to provoke a breach of peace by others.” 169
While at first glance a relatively innocuous holding,
Coleman’s decision to sustain Cox’s injunction did at least two
things. One, it muted civil rights protest by lowering the number
of street protesters that could lawfully picket a business to six, a
relatively small number. Two, it granted law enforcement a
relatively broad amount of discretion in determining what was and
was not “calculated to provoke a breach of peace.” Given that so
much of civil rights movement activity had attempted to provoke
breaches of the peace in 1963, 1964 and 1965, this suggests that
Coleman was joining other conservative judges, like Cox, to
discourage such activity.
While certainly not an absolute
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endorsement of Cox’s rather draconian order, it arguably indicated
a move to shorten the leash, if you will, on demonstrators. 170
Coleman shortened the leash even further in August 1970.
That month, Coleman voted against the family of Benjamin
Brown, a SNCC activist who had been shot and killed when police
fired into a crowd of demonstrators in Jackson. Unsympathetic to
the Browns’ claim that they should have been allowed access to
the police files in the case, Coleman argued that it was a “favorite
ploy” of the “law violator” to sue police on “some pretext or
another.” 171 Downplaying the fact that Brown had been brutally
killed for what appeared to be no good reason, Coleman sided
firmly with law enforcement, arguing that “fishing” expeditions
into police files should not be allowed, lest they undermine the
“judicial process.” 172
Two weeks later, Coleman ruled against another civil rights
activist in Louisiana who was charged with battery and requested
removal from state to federal court. The facts of this case were
particularly remarkable. Sometime on the evening of July 28,
1966, an African American activist named Zelma Wyche led a
group of over fifty blacks, some of them armed, to a truck stop in
Tallulah, Louisiana to investigate a report that the café had denied
service to a black patron. 173 Upon arriving at the café, Wyche
demanded that the manager be sent for. After a patron suggested
that Wyche look for the manager himself, the activist retorted
“What is it to you?” and then asked the patron “Do you want your
ass whipped?” 174 When the patron tried to leave, Wyche gave two
shrill whistles, prompting several members of the black entourage
to attack the customer. Only when another white customer
produced a shotgun did the attackers desist. 175
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To Coleman, this type of aggressive civil rights vigilantism
was completely unacceptable. In his dissenting opinion, Coleman
argued that Wyche was not engaged in protected activity and
should not have been allowed to remove his case to federal court.
Yet, the majority disagreed, granting Wyche a hearing at the
federal district level to determine whether his battery charge
should in fact have been removed to federal court under the theory
that he had been engaged in constitutionally protected activity.
Lamenting the ruling, Coleman noted that the majority had
inflicted “a Sunday punch” on the “sagging ability of local
governments to enforce their laws against crimes of violence.” 176
Two years after being outvoted in Wyche, Coleman gained
the upper hand. In January 1972, he delivered a majority opinion
that challenged the ability of nonviolent protesters to have their
cases removed from state to federal court, thereby undermining the
expanded removal remedy that the Fifth Circuit had worked hard
to develop in the 1960s. 177 Specifically, Coleman confronted an
appeal from a group of student activists who had been commuting
regularly to Mendenhall, Mississippi from Jackson in January and
February of 1970 to participate in marches and demonstrations. 178
One night after a demonstration, the appellants were pulled over by
state troopers and arrested for reckless driving. The students were
then taken to the local jail, where troopers and county police
shaved the leader’s head and poured moonshine on his scalp.
Though the act drew no blood and left no scar, it sent the victim
into fits of pain, torturing him.
Coleman showed little interest.
While considerable
evidence existed to suggest that the troopers had engaged in torture
to discourage civil rights, Coleman went out of his way to defend
the police. According to him, the fact that the demonstrations were
in one county and the arrest in another, coupled with police
testimony that the driver had been veering between lanes,
suggested that there was no relation between the demonstrations
and the arrests. Because the arrests were not designed to interfere
with constitutional rights, he continued, the case should be
remanded to state court. 179
Judge John R. Brown, in a vigorous one hundred forty-page
dissent disagreed, warning that Coleman’s opinion threatened not
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only to limit the removal remedy, but also to excuse a blatant
attempt to prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional
rights. Noting that the state troopers had been present at the
demonstration, had taken photographs of the activists, and had
later followed the van out of Mendenhall, Brown concluded that
the true motivation behind the arrest was to prevent further
demonstrations, not apprehend reckless drivers. Bolstering this
conclusion, argued Brown, was the torture of the leader, along with
evidence that the state troopers had warned him about participating
in civil rights activities in Mendenhall before, promising that they
were “not going to take anymore of this civil rights stuff.” 180 All
of these factors combined, concluded Brown, to show that both the
arrests and the state prosecution were a “classic example of the
misuse of State criminal procedures for the sole purpose of
intimidating the exercise of equal civil rights.” 181
Coleman, relying heavily on the testimony of the state
troopers involved, stood fast. To him, the relatively obvious
targeting of the activists by the police was less important than the
lawlessness that the activists themselves were engaged in. Shifting
attention from the police to the activists and their friends, Coleman
focused on the fact that two acquaintances of the demonstrators,
both ministers, had arrived at the jail where the activists were
being held with weapons in their car, pleading for their release.
Though the ministers left their weapons as they entered the station,
an altercation ensued between them and the police, during which a
sheriff was allegedly punched in the face. To Coleman, this type
of aggressive civil rights “activism” was unacceptable. “[W]e are
under no duty,” he wrote, “to extend some kind of left handed
judicial approval to the practice of carrying an arsenal of weapons
on night time visits to jails or police stations, even if the possession
of such weapons is otherwise lawful.” 182
Though the visit by the two ministers to the jail arguably
had nothing to do with the viability of the constitutional claims of
the arrested students, Coleman’s holding reflected a new angle of
attack, if you will, against direct action protest. Instead of a
decision about civil rights, Coleman transformed his opinion into a
defense of law enforcement. According to him, state police had
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not gone after civil rights activists but rather, civil rights protesters
had sent armed emissaries after the police. 183
Perhaps surprisingly, Coleman won support for this
position. Twelve months after overruling Judge Brown, he
marshaled a majority en banc opinion on the same case over the
protests of John Minor Wisdom. 184 While Wisdom joined Brown
in arguing for a broad reading of the removal remedy, the en banc
majority affirmed Coleman’s holding that the measure did not
allow the federal government to intervene when law enforcement
was “lawfully carrying out” its duties. 185 Although there was
substantial evidence to suggest that this was not happening, as
illustrated by the torture of the Jackson civil rights leader, the
majority joined Coleman in rejecting the compensatory claims of
the demonstrators. 186 Though briefly overshadowed by state
politics, Coleman’s commitment to ending public violence and
bolstering law enforcement had eventually taken hold in the
federal courts.

CONCLUSION
Several factors contributed to the ascendance of Coleman’s
law enforcement vision. One was Coleman’s ability to reframe
resistance to civil rights in a racially neutral manner, something
that he had begun to do while governor of Mississippi in the 1950s.
Another was a dramatic change in how those who challenged racial
norms were handled in the Deep South Taking the Mendenhall
case as an example, the act of applying alcohol to a newly shaved
head, though excruciating, lacked the potential to generate the kind
of outrage that Emmett Till’s mangled corpse had in 1955. This
explains Coleman’s willingness to reject the claims of the
Mendenhall demonstrators. He had worked hard to modernize law
enforcement in Mississippi precisely because he understood how
acts of public violence could jeopardize southern interests.
Bloodless acts of private violence, on the other hand, particularly
those that caused no “spectacle” and made no mark, left Coleman
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indifferent. 187 So long as torturers devised traceless methods of
administering pain, torture could continue.
While it would be a mistake to equate Mississippi with the
rest of the South, Coleman endorsed reforms that dramatically
altered the balance of power in his state, removing autonomy from
local officials and granting it to centralized authorities. To take
just a few examples, he expanded the jurisdiction and reach of state
police, improved information gathering, and extended appellate
review to local justices of the peace. While Coleman’s ultimate
goal was to facilitate evasion of Brown, many of these reforms had
a positive effect on African Americans who had long known the
state to be complicit in public torture and killing.
Not just a representative of Mississippi, J.P. Coleman
ended up having an influence on much of the region as a Fifth
Circuit Judge. At the time, the Fifth Circuit controlled most of the
Deep South, including Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, and Texas. 188 As an appellate judge, Coleman punished
public killers like the murderers of Viola Liuzzo but not police
who pursued more “gentle” forms of punishment, like the shaving
of the activist in Mendenhall. 189 In so doing, Coleman sent a
relatively clear message that the era of public torture and murder
for racial transgressions had come to an end. Though he was
certainly not alone in drawing the curtain on lynching, his role as
governor of one of the South’s most recalcitrant states during the
height of massive resistance, coupled with his role on the Fifth
Circuit in the 1970s and 80s, make him a particularly compelling
lens through which to view transformations in how the South dealt
with race. Many of his reforms live on in Mississippi today, just as
his judicial opinions remain a part of federal law. Coleman’s story
helps show how southern attitudes towards the “spectacle of the
scaffold” evolved relatively quickly in the aftermath of Brown and
the murder of Emmett Till. 190
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